Country Profile: Syria
Context
Independent Syrian media in exile emerged as a result of the 2011 uprising and its violent repression: often emerging from citizen journalism and then evolving into professionalized newsrooms operating across borders. Over the past decade, the sector experienced waves of displacement – first into neighbouring countries (2012–2013), then deeper into Europe (2015–2016), especially after conditions in Turkey, where many media initially relocated to, deteriorated.
Since the fall of the regime of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 the sector has experienced a structural shift rather than a “return to normal”. Indeed, most outlets now find themselves in conflicting realities and a full return to the country from exile is prevented by unclear and unfinished administrative regularization, a precarious security situation (especially in some parts of the country), socio-political turmoil and a funding landscape that itself is undergoing a deep crisis.
A new interim constitution, signed into law in March 2025 and valid for 5 years, formally guarantees freedom of expression but allows restrictions for reasons such as “public order” or “national unity,” granting authorities broad discretionary power. In practice the Ministry of Information – a key institution of media control under Assad now under new leadership – plays a core role in monitoring and regulating the media sector.
The Ministry has sole regulatory authority (there is no independent media regulator) and is responsible for issuing licenses. These are based on paying fees (at least $10,000 for broadcast media, around $1,000 for online publications), office size requirements, providing staff lists (something that has aroused concern amid some media, due to their history of persecution) and proof of technical infrastructure.
Amid completing their paperwork, media expect to receive a preliminary approval, which is followed by a long-term (5 year) license after a trial period. However, in practice the status remains unclear – with licenses granted upon completing paperwork – in practice some media receive licenses while others are pending without explanation.
Despite the country opening up to independent media, most outlets remain stuck in limbo, operating a hybrid model. Many media have de facto opened in-country offices but are unable to fully normalize their work due to complex requirements in terms of authorization, registration and licensing. These issues in turn create various practical challenges, from banking to employment.
While independent journalistic work does not formally require a press card (unless official permits are needed), journalists must carry a mission letter issued by the Ministry of Information, separate from the Syrian Journalists’ Union card (this institution was dissolved in February 2025 and reconstituted under new management in May 2025).
There is some competition regarding authority to regulate the sector, e.g., between the Ministry and the Union over professional accreditation. The Ministry is currently working on a new Media Law to regulate the sector. Competing drafts are being advanced by the Ministry, the Journalists’ Union, and the Syrian Center for Freedom of Expression, reflecting internal power struggles.
As a result, the new government has struggled to properly regulate the press sector due to a combination of conflicting priorities, lack of necessary competencies, and a desire to control a rising misinformation crisis (and generally to control narratives). Multiple actors contribute to information manipulation, including networks linked to the former regime seeking to destabilize the new authorities, pro-government voices minimizing abuses and delegitimizing critics, and religious or ethnic communities amplifying narratives that serve communal interests. Jihadist groups such as ISIS actively incite violence against minorities, while foreign states—including Russia, Iran, Israel, Turkey, and Qatar—fund media and digital influence operations that blur the line between propaganda and biased reporting.
Social media platforms are the main distribution channels, with Facebook dominating, followed by WhatsApp and Telegram, while YouTube and Instagram play smaller roles. Core narratives revolve around sectarian victimhood, conspiracy theories portraying minorities as threats, claims that the new government lacks legitimacy, and allegations of foreign manipulation.
Disinformation has directly contributed to several major violent incidents, including the March 2025 coastal massacres accompanied by viral execution videos, alleged abductions of Alawite women, Druze–Sunni clashes triggered partly by an unverified audio recording, and the June 2025 church attack exploited by ISIS propaganda.
While there have been positive attempts e.g. to create an industry ethics code (with government pledges to have state-run media abide by it), the general sense among the independent media is one of frustration at a seemingly endless list of permissions required by authorities.
One media manager complained that one needs “12 types of registration” for a simple news website; another noted that even printing a small-run publication meant the printing house needed to secure a special permission; reporting required accreditation and permissions for both the travel and reporting that could take weeks. It is worth noting that some such authorisations are common in high-press-freedom countries, and exiled media have simply not experienced such demands in previous years. However, the administrative burden is significant, which has resulted in a media space that is tilted in favour of toward state run media and foreign-funded large private media (primarily by Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey).
Multiple journalists, media managers and experts have noted that the administrative challenges are not driven by a fundamental opposition to free media (though this appears to be a low priority issue), but rather government’s concern about the significant misinformation crisis in the country. This misinformation crisis has polarized society and fuelled inter-group resentment and violence.
Persistent security issues, including ongoing fighting between different ethnic groups, has created a further complication. Journalists have been killed¹, been wounded, detained, or banned from such regions as Sweida in the country’s south, in the coastal Latakia province, and the Kurdish North-East.
In addition to the considerable administrative, security and social challenges, Syrian exiled media are facing a uniquely challenging funding landscape. The closure of USAID has increased competition for funding – including from various European donors who play an important role in supporting Syrian outlets.
Arguably even more disruptive is a change in mandate among some donors – with new programs being focused on legal entities based in-country (rather than abroad). Given that most exiled media have not yet been able to regularize their legal status within Syria and/ or do not have the corresponding banking infrastructure, they have been unable to follow the shift in resource allocation.
Syria is yet to develop reliable banking and telecommunications infrastructure. Although Caesar Act sanctions were partially lifted in December 2025 (easing the way for Western financial institutions to open correspondent banking accounts with the Syrian Central Bank), Syria’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism, ongoing 180-day security reviews, and deep mistrust of Syrian banks pre-2011 continue to obstruct financial transfers.
As a result, after more than a year following the fall of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime, expectations are mixed. Syrian exiled independent media have proven that re-seeding a media ecosystem that was closed for years is theoretically possible. But whether the new Syria will be able to provide them with the conditions to grow and fully accomplish their important social mission is still an open question.
¹ According to the International Federation of Journalists, two journalists were killed in Syria in 2025. Ibrahim Ajaj’s body was founded after he had been abducted by two men from his home in Hama. Sari Majid Al-Shoufi was killed during armed clashes in western Sweida.